This paper provides evidence on the types of accounts that reveal earnings management activities. We build on Burgstahler and Dichev's (1997) evidence of earnings management to avoid an earnings decline and Phillips et al. 's (2003) findings that deferred tax expense can be used to detect such earnings management. In particular, we investigate the relation between changes in annual earnings and changes in deferred tax asset and liability components using firms' income tax footnote disclosures. We establish the incremental usefulness of the change in net deferred tax liabilities (DTLs) in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline, and then decompose the total change in net DTLs into eight components to determine which types of accounts are associated with earnings management activities. Our evidence indicates that firms use revenue and expense accruals and reserves and other asset valuation accruals to manage earnings upwards.
Decomposing Changes in Deferred Tax Assets and Liabilities to Isolate Earnings Management Activities ABSTRACT:
This paper provides evidence on the types of accounts that reveal earnings management activities. We build on Burgstahler and Dichev's (1997) evidence of earnings management to avoid an earnings decline and Phillips et al.'s (2003) findings that deferred tax expense can be used to detect such earnings management. In particular, we investigate the relation between changes in annual earnings and changes in deferred tax asset and liability components using firms' income tax footnote disclosures. We establish the incremental usefulness of the change in net deferred tax liabilities (DTLs) in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline, and then decompose the total change in net DTLs into eight components to determine which types of accounts are associated with earnings management activities. Our evidence indicates that firms use revenue and expense accruals and reserves and other asset valuation accruals to manage earnings upwards.
In addition, we build on Joos et al.'s (2003) results and partition our sample into firmyears with positive and negative changes in net DTLs and repeat our analyses. We find that both sub-samples manage revenue and expense accruals and reserves to report earnings increases; however, only firm-years with a positive change in net DTL also reflect the use of the deferred tax asset valuation allowance account to manage earnings upward, and only firm-years with a negative change in net DTL also manage earnings upward using other asset valuation accruals.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we provide evidence on the types of accounts that reveal earnings management activities. We build on Burgstahler and Dichev's (1997) evidence of earnings management to avoid an earnings decline and Phillips, Pincus, and Rego's (PPR) (2003) findings that deferred tax expense can be used to detect such earnings management. In particular, we investigate the relation between changes in annual earnings and changes in the components of deferred tax assets and liabilities from firms' annual income tax footnote disclosures.
Following Mills and Newberry (2001) , PPR (2003) argue that managers typically have more discretion in financial reporting than in tax reporting and can exploit such discretion to manage income upwards in ways that do not affect current taxable income. Such earnings management will generate book-tax differences that increase a firm's net deferred tax liability (i.e., deferred tax liabilities minus net deferred tax assets) and, consequently, increase its deferred income tax expense. Consistent with this argument, PPR (2003) find that deferred tax expense, their empirical surrogate for book-tax differences, is generally incrementally useful beyond total accruals and two abnormal accrual measures in detecting earnings management to avoid reporting an earnings decline. By investigating the abilities of specific components of a firm's net deferred tax liability to detect such earnings management, we triangulate the findings in Mills and Newberry (2001) and PPR (2003) that are consistent with using taxable income as an earnings management benchmark.
We also contribute to the line of research that explores whether firms use the deferred tax asset valuation allowance account as an earnings management tool (e.g., Miller and Skinner 1998; Visvanathan 1999; Bauman et al. 2001; Burgstahler et al. 2002; Frank and Rego 2003; Schrand and Wong 2003) because the valuation allowance account is one of the deferred tax liability components we consider. While income-increasing earnings management activities relating to nontax accounts increase a firm's net deferred tax liability (Mills and Newberry 2001; PPR 2003) , income-increasing earnings management of the valuation allowance decreases a firm's net deferred tax liability. Our analysis of the change in net deferred tax liability components separates the competing effects of pre-tax and valuation allowance-related earnings management on a firm's total net deferred tax liability.
Although PPR (2003) use deferred tax expense as their empirical surrogate for book-tax differences, we use the change in net deferred tax liabilities (which can, but need not always equal a firm's deferred tax expense) to examine the relation between book-tax differences and the probability of earnings management to avoid an earnings decline. We use change in net deferred tax liabilities because firms must disclose the significant components of their deferred tax assets and liabilities, whereas they are not required to disclose the components of deferred tax expense. However, mergers, acquisitions, divestitures, and other comprehensive income items create differences between deferred tax expense and the change in net deferred tax liabilities, and thus we first confirm the incremental usefulness of the annual change in a firm's net deferred tax liability in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline.
Next, we utilize firms' deferred tax asset and liability footnote disclosures that are required by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109 (SFAS No. 109) to decompose the total change in a firm's net deferred tax liability into components relating to: (1) revenue and expense accruals and reserves, (2) compensation, (3) depreciation of tangible assets, (4) other asset valuation (e.g., expenses related to intangible assets, inventory, and leases), (5) miscellaneous items, (6) tax carryforwards, (7) unrealized gains and losses from securities, and (8) the deferred tax asset valuation allowance account. We investigate the relations between these components and earnings management to avoid an earnings decline using a simultaneous equation approach. The evidence based on our entire sample of firm-year observations indicates that firms use accruals and reserves and other asset valuation accruals to manage earnings upwards. Further, our analysis of the valuation allowance account (VAA) indicates that the average firm sets its VAA consistent with guidance in SFAS No. 109. In particular, the average firm sets its VAA in conjunction with expected future profitability and changes in deferred tax assets and liabilities related to accruals and reserves, tax carryforwards, depreciation, and miscellaneous deferred tax assets and liabilities.
In a recent paper, Joos, Pratt, and Young (2003) partition firm-years into those with positive and negative deferred tax expense (DTE). Joos et al. replicate the results in PRR (2003) but find that firm-years with negative DTE drive the results, consistent with firms using less persistent accruals (e.g., restructuring charges) to manage earnings toward a target. Extending Joos et al. (2003) , we partition our sample into firm-years with positive and negative changes in net deferred tax liabilities (DTLs). We find that both sub-samples manage accruals and reserves to report earnings increases; however, only firm-years with a positive change in net DTL also use the VAA to report an earnings increase, and only firm-years with a negative change in net DTL manage earnings upward using other asset valuation accruals. Our research design enables us to separate the competing effects of upward earnings management via the VAA (which decreases net DTLs) versus upward earnings management via other pre-tax accruals (which increase net DTLs). Accordingly, we conclude that the Joos et al. (2003) finding that DTE is not incrementally useful in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline when DTE is greater than zero is likely due to those firms managing both pre-tax earnings and the VAA. This paper contributes to accounting and tax research that examines book-tax differences.
First, it extends research that considers book-tax differences as measures of earnings management (e.g., Mills and Newberry 2001; Dhaliwal et al. 2003; Joos et al. 2003; PPR 2003) .
Second, it builds on research that considers book-tax differences as a source of information to capital market participants and other stakeholders (e.g. , Hanlon 2003a; Hanlon 2003b; Mills and Plesko 2003; Schmidt 2003) . In addition, this paper highlights the breadth of information available in firms' income tax footnote disclosures.
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 develops our hypotheses, Section 3 examines the incremental usefulness of the total change in net deferred tax liabilities to detect earnings management, Section 4 examines the usefulness of the components of the change in net deferred tax liabilities to detect earnings management, Section 5 provides the results of separately investigating sub-samples based on whether the changes in firms' net deferred tax liabilities are positive or negative, and Section 6 concludes.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Pre-tax Earnings Management
Earnings management is accomplished through managerial discretion over accounting choices and operating cash flows. Newberry (2001) and PPR (2003) argue that booktax differences help separate discretion in managers' actions from nondiscretionary choices and assume that firms seeking to manage income upwards prefer to do so without increasing their tax costs. We refer to such actions as "tax-efficient" earnings management. Erickson et al. (2002) provide limited evidence on this assumption. They examine a sample of 27 firms cited by the SEC for fraudulent financial reporting and find that 16 firms increased book income by incurring a tax cost (i.e., through book-tax conforming accruals). For these 16 firms, the tax cost averaged 19 percent of the overstatement. Mills and Newberry (2001) observe actual book-tax differences using confidential tax return data and note that firms reporting slightly positive earnings changes have larger book-tax differences than firms with slightly negative earnings changes. PPR (2003) use deferred tax expense, a publicly available measure, as their empirical surrogate for book-tax differences, and investigate publicly traded firms' earnings management behavior. They compare the ability of DTE and accrual-based metrics used in prior research to detect earnings management activity, generally finding that DTE is incrementally useful to accrual-based measures in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline or to avoid a loss.
We use the change in a firm's net deferred tax liability (change in net DTL), rather than DTE, as the proxy for book-tax differences. Computed in accordance with SFAS No. 109, the change in net DTL equals the change in deferred tax liabilities minus the change in net deferred tax assets. Deferred tax assets and deferred tax liabilities are temporary differences, which SFAS No. 109 defines as differences between the financial accounting and tax bases of assets and liabilities that are expected to reverse in the future. (Permanent differences do not reverse.) Deferred tax liabilities (assets) increase as firms currently recognize revenue and/or defer expense (expense and/or defer revenue) for book purposes relative to their tax reporting, resulting in future taxable (deductible) amounts. All else equal, firms report higher pre-tax book income relative to taxable income when they have increases in their net DTLs, and vice versa.
Under SFAS No. 109, the increase (decrease) in net DTL can equal a firm's deferred tax expense (benefit) for the period, but differences are common. Differences typically occur when firms engage in mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures, or report other comprehensive income items; these items can affect deferred tax accounts on the balance sheet without affecting DTE on the income statement. Firms generally do not disclose the components of DTE; hence, DTE is an aggregate amount that masks its components and thus the possible sources of earnings management activity. In contrast, firms must disclose the significant components of their net DTLs. Hence, examining the components of the change in net DTLs has the potential to reveal the areas that likely reflect significant earnings management activity.
Our first step is to investigate whether the change in net DTLs, like DTE, is incrementally useful in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline, or if the effects of non-income-related changes in net DTLs render it useless in this regard. We hypothesize:
H1:
The change in the net deferred tax liability is incrementally useful to accrual measures in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline.
Next, we focus on the components of changes in net DTLs. SFAS No. 109 requires the disclosure of the types and dollar amounts of significant temporary differences that give rise to deferred tax assets and liabilities. We use firms' disclosures of beginning-and end-of-year deferred tax assets and liabilities to decompose the total annual change in a firm's net DTL into components that will help isolate the sources of earnings management to avoid an earnings decline. Based on firms' disclosures, we classify the components into three main categories.
The first category includes five types of changes in overall net DTL. These are book-tax basis differences resulting from (1) revenue and expense accruals and reserves, (2) compensation,
depreciation of tangible assets, (4) other asset valuation (e.g., expenses related to intangible assets, inventory, and leases), and (5) miscellaneous items. We argue that managers prefer to manage pre-tax earnings in ways that do not increase current taxable income, and such earnings management leads to greater book-tax differences and an increase in one or more of these five components, which should be useful in detecting earnings management. 4 Unrealized gains and losses are recognized on available-for-sale (AFS) securities and trading securities (TS), but cannot be used to manage earnings in a manner consistent with H2. For TS, unrealized gains and losses are recognized each period in book earnings, net of deferred taxes. The deferred tax effects are reversed upon sale of the TS when gains and losses are recognized for tax purposes. However, since changes in market prices of securities are beyond the control of management, unrealized gains and losses on TS likely do not reflect managerial discretion to manage book earnings. For AFS securities, there are no book income effects until AFS securities are sold. Unrealized gains and losses on AFS securities are recognized each period in shareholders' equity, net of deferred taxes. Any unrealized gains and losses, net of deferred taxes, are reversed upon sale of the AFS securities when gains and losses are recognized for both book and tax purposes. Note that the reversal of the deferred tax liabilities (assets) is opposite to what is expected under (and is thus inconsistent with) H2. For example, an unrealized gain on AFS securities bypasses income but increases both shareholders' equity and DTLs. Upon sale, the unrealized gain is reversed as is the DTL; hence, DTLs decrease when both book and taxable incomes increase; i.e., there is book-tax conformity yet DTLs are falling at the time of sale. The only way a firm can use securities to manage earnings in a manner consistent with H2 would be if a firm opportunistically sells AFS securities (i.e., engages in cherry picking). However, as noted above, there would be book-tax conformity at the time of sale, and if unrealized gains and losses had been provided on the AFS securities, then the deferred tax effects of such sales would be opposite to that expected under H2. Thus, we treat changes in net DTLs due to unrealized gain and losses on both AFS and trading securities as unrelated to earning management activities.
carryforwards and unrealized gains and losses on securities on the one hand, and a firm's status as an earnings management firm on the other.
Management of the Deferred Tax Asset Valuation Allowance
The third net DTL component category we consider is the deferred tax asset valuation allowance account. Although SFAS No. 109 gives full recognition to deferred tax assets, a firm must provide a valuation allowance if it is "more likely than not" that a deferred tax asset will not be realized (FASB 1992, ¶17e) . Firms can manage earnings by opportunistically increasing and decreasing the VAA, but such earnings management would reflect management of DTE, not management of pre-tax income. Increases in the VAA increase DTE by reducing tax benefits, and thereby decrease book income, whereas decreases in the VAA decrease DTE by reducing tax expense, and thus increase book income. 5 Hence, in contrast to pre-tax earnings management to increase income, which increases DTE, management of the VAA to increase income decreases DTE (and thus decreases net DTLs).
6
Previous research investigates potential earnings management through the VAA. Using samples of heterogeneous firms, Miller and Skinner (1998) , Visvanathan (1998) , and Bauman et al. (2001) provide little evidence of earnings management via the VAA. In contrast, Burgstahler, et al. (2002) and Schrand and Wong (2003) use narrowly defined samples and conclude that certain firms (e.g., firms with near-zero earnings and banks) use the VAA to manage earnings around certain earnings targets. Frank and Rego (2003) use a broad sample of firms to investigate whether managers use the VAA to manage earnings around three earnings targets: to 5 An exception is changes in the VAA due to nonqualified stock option tax deductions, which do not affect earnings. See Burgstahler et al. (2002) or Frank and Rego (2003) for a detailed discussion of changes in the VAA that do not affect earnings. 6 Managing earnings upwards by lowering the VAA affects reported net income by producing a deferred tax benefit. However, if managers manipulate reported net income via pre-tax accruals, earnings will be affected in two ways. For example, reducing the provision for bad debts will (1) increase earnings (relative to taxable income) and give rise to an increase in the firm's net DTL, but (2) the earnings increase will be partially offset by an increase in DTE.
report a positive profit, to report an earnings increase, and to meet or beat the mean analyst forecast. They also consider both upward earnings management and downward earnings management (i.e., smoothing) towards an earnings target. Their results indicate that firms use the VAA to manage earnings around the mean analyst forecast. However, their results are mixed as to whether firms use the VAA to manage earnings around positive profit and earnings increase targets.
We extend prior VAA research by considering the indirect effects that other earnings management activities may have on the VAA. These indirect effects result from accounting estimates that not only provide managers with the opportunity to manage earnings but also produce temporary book-tax differences that create deferred tax assets and liabilities. For example, suppose a firm experiences poor operating performance and scales back its operations and recognizes an impairment charge for assets to be withdrawn from operations and sold, but over-provides for the impairment in its accrual. The impairment charge creates a deferred tax asset, but if the firm is unlikely to report taxable income in the near future, it would derive little or no tax benefit from the write-off. Accordingly, the firm would provide a valuation allowance related to the impairment charge. Now assume in the following year, prior to disposing of the assets, the firm reverses the excess impairment provision and the related deferred tax asset. The reversal increases income, net of DTE. In addition, the reduced deferred tax asset would cause a reduction in the VAA, thereby further increasing income. Focusing simply on the VAA would lead to the incorrect inference that this account had been managed to increase earnings. In contrast, our examination of the VAA will consider how all business activities (earnings management and otherwise) affect all components of net DTLs simultaneously, which helps prevent making such incorrect inferences.
We test the following hypothesis:
H3:
The change in the deferred tax asset valuation allowance is useful in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline.
INCREMENTAL USEFULNESS OF THE TOTAL CHANGE IN NET DTL
To test H1, we replicate PPR (2003) using the change in net DTLs, instead of DTE, as the empirical surrogate for book-tax differences. We first discuss the data, and then present a modified PPR (2003) and other flow-through entities (SIC code 6795) since these firms do not account for income tax expense. In addition, firms must report minimum requisite data (e.g., net DTLs and scaled earnings changes). Our sample selection procedures generate a potential sample of 4,325 firmyear observations with a scaled earnings change, defined as the annual change in net income divided by market value of equity, between -0.01 and 0.01. From this potential sample, we randomly select a sub-sample of 950 firm-years for which we hand collect data necessary to compute the change in the net DTL components from the firms' Form 10K income tax footnote disclosures. 8 We find 532 firm-years with the necessary income tax footnote data to calculate the change in net DTL components. However, deletion of firm-year observations that lack the required control variables for our system of equations (see Section 4.2) results in a final sample of 431 firm-year observations.
EM Model
To examine whether the change in net DTL, like DTE, is a surrogate for book-tax differences that is incrementally useful beyond accrual-based measures in detecting earnings management, we estimate the following pooled, cross-sectional model using probit regression:
where EM it = 1 if the change in firm i's net income (annual Compustat data item #172) from year t-1 to t divided by the market value of equity at the end of year t-2 (annual Compustat data items #25 × #199) is ≥ 0 and < 0.01, and 0 if the change in net income is ≥ -0.01 and < 0;
∆NDTL it = the annual change in firm i's net deferred tax liability, calculated using deferred tax assets and liabilities disclosed in firms' income tax footnotes, between years t-1 and t, scaled by total assets at t-1;
MAD it = 1 if firm i has a merger or acquisition (annual Compustat data item #1 = 'AA', 'AB', 'AR', or 'AS') or divestiture (annual Compustat data item #66 ≠ 0) in year t, and 0 otherwise;
AC it = a measure of firm i's accruals (see below) in year t;
∆CFO it = the change in firm i's cash flows from continuing operations (annual Compustat data items #308 -#124) from year t-1 to t, scaled by total assets (Compustat #6) as of the end of year t-1; and
is (is not) in industry j in year t, based on 1-digit SIC codes.
8 Compustat reports a positive deferred tax liability (annual data item #74) if a firm has a net DTL (i.e., DTL -DTA > 0). However, if a firm has a net deferred tax asset (i.e., DTL -DTA < 0), Compustat includes the net DTA in "Assets-Other" (item # 69). Hence, one cannot isolate net DTA values using Compustat data, and thus the total change in net DTL can be calculated using only data from firms' income tax footnote disclosures.
Equation (1) augments the model estimated by PPR (2003). In particular, MAD it is an
indicator variable that equals 1 (0) if there is (is not) a merger, acquisition, or divestiture for firm i in year t since these transactions can induce changes in net DTLs that have no effect on deferred tax expense as shown on the income statement. 9 We also interact MAD it with ∆NDTL it .
By allowing an incremental intercept and incremental slope for firm-years with mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures, we control for their effects on changes in net DTL, and thus a positive coefficient on ∆NDTL it (i.e., β 1 > 0), would be consistent with H1. That is, a positive β 1 would indicate that the probability of earnings management to avoid an earnings decline increases with scaled ∆NDTL it . Similar to PPR, AC it represents one of three accrual variablestotal accruals (Healy 1985) , modified Jones model abnormal accruals (Dechow et al. 1995) , or forward-looking abnormal accruals (Dechow et al. 2003 ) -as proxies for accruals that reflect earnings management. We expect the coefficient on AC it to be positive in the presence of earnings management to avoid an earnings decline. 10 Including both ∆NDTL and AC in the model allows us to determine the incremental usefulness of each measure in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline, and we interpret a positive coefficient on ∆NDTL (AC) as evidence of such incremental usefulness beyond AC (∆NDTL). sample. Finally, a test of medians indicates that the EM = 1 sample has higher average ∆CFO compared to the EM = 0 sample.
Descriptive Statistics
Multivariate Results
We report the results of estimating equation (1) using probit in Table 2 . In column (1), we compare the change in net DTLs and total accruals with regard to incremental usefulness in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline. We find that both variables have positive coefficients, but only the coefficient on ∆NDTL is statistically significant (p-value = 0.0705). In column (2) we compare ∆NDTL and abnormal accruals from the modified Jones model. Again, the coefficient on ∆NDTL is statistically significant (p-value = 0.0822), while the coefficient on AbAccMJ is not. Column (3) indicates that both ∆NDTL and abnormal accruals from the forward-looking model are incrementally useful in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline (p-values of 0.0853 and 0.0398, respectively). Note that in all three sets of comparisons, the coefficient on ∆NDTL it xMAD it is significantly negative. This result is consistent with merger, acquisition, and divestiture transactions obscuring the analysis if not controlled for and suggests that the probability of managing earnings upwards to avoid an earnings decline is decreasing in changes in net DTLs when firms engage in mergers, acquisitions, or divestitures. Also note that the change in operating cash flows is significant in each estimated model. Overall, these results are consistent with those reported by PPR (2003) using DTE instead of ∆NDTL, except that PPR find that TAcc is also significant. Thus, we demonstrate that ∆NDTL is incrementally useful in detecting earnings management to avoid a loss after controlling for the occurrence of mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures.
INCREMENTAL USEFULNESS OF THE CHANGE IN NET DTL COMPONENTS
Potential Simultaneity
Having established the incremental usefulness of the total change in net DTL in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline, we next decompose the total change in net DTL into eight components to investigate whether changes in these components are similarly useful. In this investigation, we allow for the possibility that the change in net DTL components and a firm's classification as an earnings management firm are determined simultaneously. We do so for three reasons. First, if a firm successfully manages income to avoid an earnings decline in a way that avoids a current tax cost, then the change in its net DTL components that results from its earnings management activities and its classification as an earnings management firm will be determined simultaneously. Second, allowing for the simultaneous determination of the changes in net DTL components follows SFAS No. 109 guidance for setting the deferred tax asset valuation allowance account because the VAA, which is one of our net DTL components, should decrease (increase) with increases (decreases) in the other net DTL components. Third, because our system of equations (see below) includes an equation for each change in net DTL component, the error terms of these eight equations will be correlated. Estimating this system of equations using a full-information method (i.e., 3SLS) will take advantage of this cross-equation correlation and allow for simultaneity.
System of Equations
We investigate the usefulness of the components of the change in net DTL in detecting earnings management by estimating the following system of equations:
∆NDTL_MISC it = ν 0 + ν 1 MAD it + ν 2 EM it + ν 3 ∆NDTL_VA it + ν 4 GROWTH it + ν 5 ∆OASSETS it + ν 6 ∆OLIABS it + ν 7 ∆SIZE it + τ it (3e)
Equation (2) represents the EM model and equations (3a) through (3h) represent the change in net DTL components models. Note that ∆NDTL it , the total annual change in firm i's net DTL in year t, equals the sum of the following eight components: ∆NDTL_ACC it ,
∆NDTL_UGL it , and ∆NDTL_VA it .
In the remainder of this subsection, we: (i) define the endogenous variables included in the system of equations, (ii) define the exogenous variables included in the system of equations, and (iii) discuss identification and estimation of these equations. Except as otherwise noted, all change variables represent the change in the variable between years t-1 and t, scaled by total assets at the end of t-1.
Endogenous Variables
EM it , the dependent variable in equation (2), is as previously defined. Using data from firms' income tax footnotes, we identify the following eight major categories of deferred tax assets and liabilities.
(1) ∆NDTL_ACC includes changes in net DTLs relating to accruals and reserves for bad debt expense, warranties, restructuring charges, and other deferred revenue and expense items that result in future tax deductions or future taxable income. (2) ∆NDTL_COMP reflects changes in net DTLs arising from book-tax differences related to compensation:
pensions, deferred compensation, employee benefit plans, and other post-employment benefits. We expect pre-tax earnings management to lead to increases in ∆NDTL_ACC, ∆NDTL_COMP, ∆NDTL_DEP, ∆NDTL_OAV, and/or ∆NDTL_MISC that are useful in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline. For example, lowering bad debt and warranty reserves and reducing deferred revenue will increase ∆NDTL_ACC (and net income), lowering estimates for pension and post-retirement benefits will increase ∆NDTL_COMP (and net income), and extending the lives of depreciable assets will increase ∆NDTL_DEP (and net income). Accordingly, we include these five components, ∆NDTL_ACC, ∆NDTL_COMP, ∆NDTL_DEP, ∆NDTL_OAV, and ∆NDTL_MISC, in the EM model, equation (3). Positive coefficients on one or more of these variables will provide evidence consistent with the usefulness of such components in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline (H2). Also, based on the expectation that pre-tax earnings management leads to an increase in these five components, we include EM in equations (3a) through (3e).
Firms can also manage earnings by lowering their VAA, which decreases total tax expense and thus increases after-tax book income. Based on this ability to manage earnings via the VAA, we include ∆NDTL_VA in the EM model (equation (2)) and vice versa. A negative coefficient on ∆NDTL_VA in the estimation of the EM model would provide evidence consistent with the usefulness of the change in the VAA in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline (H3).
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We also include ∆NDTL_VA in equations (3a) through (3e) to allow for the possibility that, when managing earnings upwards, managers choose between managing the VAA versus managing pre-tax earnings in ways that increase the components of the change in net DTLs (i.e., ∆NDTL_ACC, ∆NDTL_COMP, ∆NDTL_DEP, ∆NDTL_OAV, and ∆NDTL_MISC). We do not include ∆NDTL_VA in the ∆NDTL_CFWD or ∆NDTL_UGL models because a change in the VAA cannot lead to a change in deferred tax assets and liabilities related to tax carryforwards and unrealized gains and losses.
Consistent with SFAS No. 109, all changes in the net DTL components are included in the ∆NDTL_VA model (equation (3h)) to capture the following effects that changes in other deferred tax assets and liabilities have on changes in the VAA. First, increases in deferred tax assets (e.g., tax carryforwards) can lead to increases in the valuation allowance. This will occur 11 Beaver et al. (2003) claim that accounting for income taxes under SFAS No. 109 explains a significant portion of the discontinuity at zero in the distribution of earnings and earnings changes, rather than earnings management activity, as concluded by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) , among others. In particular, Beaver et al. point out that changes in future earnings expectations can cause a firm to increase its VAA, which would decrease earnings, potentially shifting a firm from positive earnings (earnings change) to negative earnings (earnings change). Because our research design specifically controls for changes in the VAA, we believe that the phenomenon discussed in Beaver et al. does not affect our results.
if a firm has deferred tax assets and it is "more likely than not" that at least some of the deferred tax assets will not be realized (FASB 1992, ¶17e and losses on securities that affect deferred tax assets and liabilities (see footnote 4), we also exclude EM from the ∆NDTL_UGL model. Likewise, we exclude these two change-in-net-DTL components from the EM equation (2). As previously noted, we exclude ∆NDTL_VA from both the ∆NDTL_CFWD and ∆NDTL_UGL equations because a change in the VAA cannot lead to a change in deferred tax assets related to tax carryforwards or unrealized gains and losses. Table 3 summarizes our main predictions (and the main results).
Exogenous Variables
Equations (2) and (3a) through (3h) also include control variables for a firm's status as an earnings management firm (i.e., EM = 1) and for changes in NDTL components that are unrelated to earnings management to avoid an earnings decline, respectively. Consistent with the EM model set forth in equation (1), ∆CFO is included in equation (2). GROWTH, the average growth in firm i's total assets over the years t-3 through t, scaled by total assets at the end of year t-3, is included in equations (3a) through (3h) since we expect firms with greater changes in total assets to also have greater changes in net DTL components, compared to firms with slower asset growth. MAD, as previously defined, is also included in equations (3a) through (3h) to control for the effect of mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures on the change in net DTL components.
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The ∆NDTL_ACC model, equation (3a), includes the change in net sales (∆SALES, Compustat #12), the change in accounts receivable (∆AR, Compustat #2), and the change in accounts payable (∆AP, Compustat #70) to control for changes in net DTLs due to factors relating to bad debts, warranty reserves, and other underlying changes in operations.
The ∆NDTL_COMP model, equation (3b), includes ∆SALES and the change in cost of goods sold (∆COGS, Compustat #41) as proxies for the increase in compensation-related deferred tax assets. We use COGS as a compensation proxy because a large component of COGS is labor cost and Compustat data for compensation expense and number of employees are often missing.
The ∆NDTL_DEP model (equation (3c)) contains ∆PPE, the change in gross property, plant and equipment (Compustat #7), and ∆LEV, the change in the ratio of long-term debt (Compustat #9) to common equity (Compustat #60). ∆PPE controls for changes in depreciable assets that lead to differences between the book and tax bases of such assets. Similarly, because higher leverage is associated with the ability to have greater assets in place, ∆LEV proxies for the increase in depreciable and amortizable assets.
The ∆NDTL_OAV model, equation (3d), contains ∆LEV along with ∆INV, the change in inventory (Compustat #3), as controls for changes in inventory and other assets that give rise to other asset book-tax basis differences.
The ∆NDTL_MISC model, equation (3e), contains the change in other assets (∆OASSETS, Compustat #69), the change in other liabilities (∆OLIABS, Compustat #75), and the change in firm size (∆SIZE, the change in the natural logarithm of total assets). These variables control for changes in assets and liabilities that lead to changes in net DTLs that we classify as miscellaneous.
The ∆NDTL_CFWD model, equation (3f), contains TI, the estimate of year t taxable income because a firm's net operating loss and tax credit tax carryforwards should change inversely with current taxable income. We compute TI by estimating a firm's current tax expense as the sum of its federal and foreign current tax expense (Compustat #63 + #64) divided by 35%, the top statutory U.S. tax rate in effect over the sample period (e.g., Hanlon 2003a).
The ∆NDTL_UGL model, equation (3g), includes INVEST, the level of a firm's investments (Compustat #32) and ∆INVEST. The greater a firm's investments, the more likely it will have unrealized gains and losses for GAAP purposes, which are not tax events. We also include change in investments to control for the deferred tax effects of increases and decreases in investments.
Lastly, the ∆NDTL_VA model, equation (3g), includes a control for the effect of expected profitability on the VAA because SFAS No. 109 allows managers to consider expected future taxable income when assessing the need for, and the amount of, the VAA. Following Frank and Rego (2003) and Schrand and Wong (2003) , we include a measure of historical profitability, HROA, on the assumption that past profitability will continue into the future. We compute ROA in year t as net income in year t (Compustat #172) divided by total assets at the end of year t-1. HROA is the average ROA in years t-2 and t-1.
Identification and Estimation
The system of equations represented in equations (2) and (3a) through (3h) is identified because each equation includes at least one variable unique to that equation (Greene 2003) . ∆AR
and ∆AP are only included in (3a), ∆COGS is only in (3b), ∆PPE is unique to (3c), ∆INV is only in (3d), ∆OASSETS and ∆OLIABS are unique to (3e), TI is only in (3f), ∆INVEST is only in (3g), HROA appears only in (3h), and ∆CFO is only in the EM model.
We estimate the system of equations using three-stage least squares (3SLS). We use 3SLS to allow for simultaneity of changes in net DTL components and a firm's status as an EM firm and to exploit the cross-equation correlation of the error terms, which arises from the adding-up feature of the dependent variables in equations (3a) -(3h); i.e., the sum of the eight change-in-net DTL components equals ∆NDTL. Probit is the appropriate estimation approach for the EM model since EM is a dichotomous dependent variable; however, estimating a system of equations when one or more of the endogenous dependent variables are binary is problematic (Maddala 1983) . Hence, we also estimate equations (2) and (3a) through (3h) separately, using probit for equation (2) and OLS for regressions (3a) -(3h). The results of doing so are qualitatively the same as those tabulated in this paper. Table 1 indicates that for both EM= 1 and EM = 0 sub-samples, ∆NDTL_CFWD and ∆NDTL_VA are the largest components of ∆NDTL in terms of mean values. Consistent with predictions in H2, tests of means indicate that the ∆NDTL_ACC component has a larger mean in the EM = 1 sub-sample as compared to the EM = 0 sub-sample. This result is consistent with firms using accruals and reserves to manage earnings to avoid reporting an earnings decline.
Results
Unexpectedly, the ∆NDTL_UGL (∆NDTL_COMP) component has a larger mean (median) in the EM = 1 sub-sample as compared to the EM = 0 sub-sample.
The results of estimating the nine-equation system using 3SLS appear in Table 4 is, the VAA should be positively (negatively) related to increases in deferred tax assets (liabilities). In addition, the coefficient on HROA is also significantly negative, consistent with managers increasing (decreasing) the VAA when expected future profitability is low (high).
The results for equations (3a) -(3g) reveal several additional important points. First, the coefficient on EM in these equations approaches positive significance only in the ∆NDTL_ACC equation (3a) (coefficient = 0.014, p-value = 0.121), consistent with the equation (2) results.
Second, many of the exogenous control variables work as expected in these equations, including ∆AP in (3a), ∆SALES and ∆COGS in (3b), ∆PPE in (3c), ∆INV in (3d), and TI in (3f). Third, coefficients on GROWTH are appropriately positive in (3c) and negative in (3a), (3f), and (3g).
14 Finally, the estimated coefficient on ∆NDTL_VA is significantly negative in the ∆NDTL_DEP, ∆NDTL_OAV, and ∆NDTL_MISC equations, generally consistent with the results for the ∆NDTL_VA equation (3h). dominate firm-years with positive DTE, whereas less persistent accruals such as restructuring charges and other accruals that are likely subject to greater managerial discretion dominate firm- 14 Components of the net change in DTL that are dominated by deferred tax assets (liabilities) should exhibit a negative (positive) relation with GROWTH, since deferred tax assets (liabilities) are coded as negative (positive) amounts, and we expect firms that experienced higher total asset growth over the past several years to also exhibit larger increases in deferred tax assets and liabilities. Thus, since deferred tax assets dominate the ∆NDTL_ACC, ∆NDTL_CFWD, and ∆NDTL_UGL components, and deferred tax liabilities dominate the ∆NDTL_DEP component, the negative and positive coefficients on GROWTH in these equations are as expected.
ANALYSIS OF FIRM-YEARS WITH POSITIVE VS. NEGATIVE ∆NDTL
Motivation for
years with negative DTE. However, they use Compustat data to substantiate their claims.
Because we have data on the components of deferred tax assets and liabilities, we can directly test Joos et al.'s claims.
First, we replicate PPR (2003) using the change in net DTL (instead of DTE) separately for firm-years with a positive change in net DTL and firm-years with negative change in net DTL. Second, we use 3SLS to estimate equations (2) and (3a) - (3h) for firm-years with positive change in net DTLs and do the same for firm-years with a negative change in net DTLs. Third, we use the results from the 3SLS estimations to further probe the results in PPR (2003). In particular, we use the ∆NDTL_ACC component, rather than DTE, to replicate PPR (2003).
Results for Positive vs. Negative ∆NDTL Analysis
We partition our sample into firm-year observations with positive and negative changes in net DTL and estimate equation (1) separately for each sub-sample. Table 5 15 Also of interest, total accruals is the only accrual measure significantly positively related to the probability of earnings management for firms with a positive change in net DTL (coefficient = 2.681, p-value = 0.065), while abnormal accruals from the forward-looking Jones model is the only accrual measure significantly positively related to the probability of earnings management for firms with a negative change in net DTL (coefficient = 0.452, p-value = 0.047).
To investigate this claim, we consider the components of the change in net DTL and estimate the system of equations ( (2) and (3a) -(3h)) separately for firm-years with positive and negative changes in net DTL. The results for firm-years with positive and negative changes in net DTLs are presented in Table 6 . 16 The equation (2) results in Table 6 for firm-years with a positive change in net DTL suggest that these firms use accruals and reserves and the VAA to manage earnings to avoid reporting an earnings decline. This result is striking because upward earnings management via the VAA has the opposite impact on DTE and ∆NDTL (i.e., reduces DTE and ∆NDTL) as compared to upward earnings management via pre-tax accruals, such as accruals and reserves (i.e., increases DTE and ∆NDTL). Thus, Joos et al. likely do not find a significant relation between DTE and the probability of earnings management to avoid an earnings decline for firm-years with a positive change in DTE because ∆NDTL_ACC and ∆NDTL_VAA have opposite effects on DTE.
The equation (2) results for firm-years with a negative change in net DTL suggest that these firms use accruals and reserves as well as other asset valuation accruals to manage earnings to avoid an earnings decline. Taken together, the results in Table 6 for firms with positive and negative changes in net DTL indicate that (1) irrespective of the sign of the change in net DTLs, managers use accruals and reserves to manage earnings upwards, whereas (2) only firm-years with a positive change in net DTL reflect the use of the VAA to manage earnings, and (3) only firm-years with a negative change in net DTL reflect the use of other asset valuation accruals to manage earnings. Overall, the results in Tables 5 and 6 consistently suggest that the accruals and reserves component reflects earnings management activities to avoid an earnings decline.
Given the consistency of the results for the ∆NDTL_ACC variable, we explore the extent to which PPR's (2003) results are due to the change in net DTL associated with accruals and reserves by replacing the total change in net DTL with ∆NDTL_ACC. The results for the entire sample (see the top panel of We repeat the ∆NDTL_ACC analysis in Table 7 separately for firm-years with positive and negative changes in net DTL because the equation (2) results in Table 6 reveal that firmyears with a positive change in net DTL use both accruals and reserves and the VAA to manage earnings (which contradicts the results in Joos et al (2003)), while firm-years with a negative change in net DTL use accruals and reserves and other asset valuation accruals to manage earnings. As noted above, pre-tax earnings management via accruals and reserves and earnings management via the VAA have offsetting effects on DTE and the change in net DTL. Thus, we want to isolate the relation between the probability of earnings management and changes in deferred tax assets and liabilities related to accruals and reserves.
The results in the lower portions of are consistent with the estimated coefficients on ∆NDTL_ACC in Table 6 , in which firm-years with a positive change in net DTL have a larger coefficient on ∆NDTL_ACC (coefficient = 25.223, p-value = 0.071) compared to firm-years with a negative change in net DTL (coefficient = 3.078, p-value = <0.0001). Overall, the results in Table 7 suggest that Joos et al's (2003) conclusion that DTE is not useful in detecting earnings management for firm-years with positive DTE is not supported by a more complete analysis of the relation between earnings management activities and the components of deferred taxes. 
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS
We build on Burgstahler and Dichev's (1997) evidence of earnings management to avoid an earnings decline and Phillips at al.'s (2003) findings that deferred tax expense can be used to detect such earnings management. In particular, we investigate the relation between changes in annual earnings and changes in the components of deferred tax assets and liabilities from firms' annual income tax footnote disclosures. Our goal is to provide evidence on the types of accounts that reveal earnings management activities and thereby respond to Healy and Wahlen's (1999, 379) call for a better "understanding of the steps that firms take to increase reported earnings."
We find that, after controlling for the effects of mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures, the change in a firm's net deferred tax liability is incrementally useful to accrual-based measures in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline. Further analysis of changes in the net deferred tax liability components provides evidence that the deferred tax component reflecting revenue and expense accruals and reserves is consistently the most important factor in explaining the probability of managing earnings to avoid an earnings decline. These results are consistent with Nelson et al. (2003) who find, based on a survey of experienced auditors from a Big 5 firm, that managers are most likely to manage income upwards using accounting procedures for revenue recognition and reserves.
In contrast to abnormal accrual measures which use econometric techniques to estimate normal accruals, the change in a firm's net deferred tax liability relating to revenue and expense items uses the tax rules for such items as the relevant benchmark to use in evaluating managerial discretion, suggesting that analysis of a firm's income tax footnote disclosure may help in evaluating the quality of the firm's earnings. This paper thus contributes to the literature on book-tax differences by extending research that considers book-tax differences as measures of earnings management (e.g., Mills and Newberry 2001; Dhaliwal et al. 2003; Joos et al. 2003; PPR 2003) and that considers book-tax differences as a source of information to capital market Our results are also consistent with firms following the guidance in SFAS No. 109 regarding setting their deferred tax asset valuation allowance account based on expected future profitability and future taxable income resulting from reversals of existing net deferred tax liabilities. In addition, however, for firm-years with a positive change in their net deferred tax liability, we find that decreases in the valuation allowance account are useful in detecting earnings management to avoid an earnings decline. This evidence adds to the literature that addresses whether firms use the deferred tax asset valuation allowance account to manage earnings (e.g., Miller and Skinner 1998; Visvanathan 1999; Bauman, Bauman, and Halsey 2001; Burgstahler, Elliott, and Hanlon 2002; Frank and Rego 2003; Schrand and Wong 2003) . EM is an indicator variable = 1 if the change in net income (annual Compustat data item #172) from year t-1 to year t divided by the market value of equity at the end of year t-2 (annual Compustat data item #25 x #199) is ≥ 0 and < 0.01, and EM 1 = 0 if the change in net income is ≥-0.01 and < 0.
∆NDTL is the change in deferred tax liabilities (DTL) less the change in net deferred tax assets, where the change in net deferred tax assets is the change in deferred tax assets (DTA) less the change in the valuation allowance account (VAA). TAcc is total accruals, scaled by total assets (annual Compustat data item #6) at the end of year t-1, computed as EBEI − CFO, where EBEI is income before extraordinary items (annual Compustat data item #123), and CFO is cash flows from operations (computed as annual Compustat data items #308 -#124). AbAccMJ is abnormal accruals computed using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) . It is calculated as the difference between TAcc and normal accruals. Modified Jones model normal accruals are estimated as: TAcc it = α + β 1 (∆Sales it -∆REC it ) + β 2 PPE it , where ∆Sales is the change in the firm's sales (annual Compustat data item #12) from year t-1 to year t, ∆REC is the change in accounts receivable from operating activities (annual Compustat data item #302) from year t-1 to year t, and PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment (annual Compustat data item #7). All variables are scaled by total assets at the end of year t-1. AbAccFL is abnormal accruals computed using the forward-looking Jones model (Dechow et al. 2002) . It is calculated as the difference between TAcc and forward-looking normal accruals. Forward-looking model normal accruals are estimated as: TAcc it = α + β 1 (∆Sales it -(1 -k)∆REC it ) + β 2 PPE it + β 3 TAcc it-1 + β 4 GR_Sales t+1 , where k is the slope coefficient from a regression of ∆REC it on ∆Sales it , TAcc it-1 is total accruals from year t-1, scaled by total assets as of year t-2, and GR_Sales t+1 is the change in sales from year t to t+1, scaled by year t sales. 
